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Abstract—In this paper, we formulate the problem of trusted
routing as a transaction of services over a complex networked
environment. We present definitions from service-oriented envi-
ronments which unambiguously capture the difference between
trust and reputation relations. We show that the trustworthiness
measures associated with these relations have a linear order
embedded in them. Identifying this order structure permits us
to treat the trusted routing problem as a bi-objective path
optimization problem. Further, we present polynomial time
solutions to obtain the optimal routing paths in various bi-
objective settings. In developing these algorithms, we identify
an interesting semiring decomposition principle that yields a
distributed solution.
Keywords-Pareto Optimality, Lexicographic Optimality, Max-
Order Optimality, Semirings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) have been envisioned as
self-organising networks requiring little or no pre-established
infrastructure. The proposed ability of the hosts to dynamically
associate themselves with the network in an ad-hoc manner
has fuelled a number of application ideas for these networks.
However, recent research ([31], [25]) has revealed that this
flexibility bears with it several security and survivability
threats.
In this paper, we address the problem of trusted routing in
MANETs. The lack of pre-installed trust relations in MANETs
has steered the networking community to adopt mechanisms
from reputation technology for trusted routing ([32],[30],
[12]). However, there has been many inconsistencies in defin-
ing these trust concepts ([31]). Therefore, we introduce precise
definitions of trust concepts from the literature on reputation
systems, which has been well established and applied in e-
services and e-businesses [5]. We find that this literature
clearly distinguishes among the different forms of trust re-
lations and the trustworthiness measures associated with each
of them. We identify the existence of similar relations hidden
in the existing trusted routing protocols.
Next, we use these trust relations and measures to develop
automated decision making algorithms which are sensitive to
both performance and trust. We show that the trustworthiness
measures used in the literature have a linear order embedded
in them. Such order structures are fundamental to optimization
([2]) and help formulate the performance-trust routing prob-
lem as a bi-objective optimization problem. We also present
distributed polynomial time algorithms which can solve these
problems. Finally, we propose an application of our algorithms
using a case study. We show that our methods find efficient
trade-off points between performance and trust for routing.
This paper is organised as follows. We introduce the routing
challenges in MANET in Section II. In Section III, we
introduce trust and reputation concepts and their application
to MANET routing protocols. In Section IV, we present an
order-theoretic modelling of trustworthiness measures. We
then develop path metrics for routing in Section V. In Section
VI, we use the metrics to develop bi-objective optimization
problems and algorithms to solve them. Finally, we present a
simple case study using our algorithms in Section VII.
II. ROUTING IN MANETS
The problems of routing in MANETs have been addressed, and
various solutions inspired from different disciplines have been
proposed. Unlike in traditional information networks like the
internet, the packet forwarding in MANETs is not restricted
to a certain class of routing stations. Every station in a self-
organised MANET acts as a potential relay station. Thus, for
the functioning of higher layer protocols, it is of paramount
importance that the routing conforms to the agreed protocols
of packet forwarding.
Early routing protocols, both proactive and reactive, pro-
posed for MANETs ([4], [7], [36]) have been shown to
have many security vulnerabilities ([33], [3]). The absence
of centralized authorities have made many of the existing
security solutions infeasible for MANETs. Several proposed
schemes use cryptographic primitives to secure the existing
MANET routing protocols ([24], [39], [17], [40]). However,
these schemes are limited to detecting tampered packets and
fail to detect malicious and selfish behaviour. The latter
problem is referred to as free riding in [31]. Free riding
is a well-studied phenomenon in economics, where selfish
agents do not offer service at the promised quality ([26]). Free
riding is detrimental to a MANET because the main threat in
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establishing communication arises from the fact that the selfish
nodes might not forward packets ([21]).
In order to solve the above problem, techniques beyond
the scope of traditional cryptography have been proposed.
These solutions can be broadly classified into virtual currency
schemes and reputation schemes. A virtual currency called
nuglets was introduced in [19] to stimulate cooperation in a
MANET. Another scheme inspired from the credit market was
proposed in [34] to induce nodes to cooperate. In these works,
mechanisms were introduced to charge and pay each station
involved in the transmission of packets.
In these proposed virtual markets, there is a strong depen-
dence on the use of tamper-proof hardware to monitor the
market fluctuations. This is a very stringent requirement for
autonomous MANETs. As an alternative, schemes based on
trust and reputation technology have been introduced.
III. TRUST AND REPUTATION INSPIRED ROUTING
PARADIGM
Several reputation schemes that mitigate the selfish behaviour
in MANET were proposed (e.g., [35], [32],[15], [30]). The
concepts of trust and reputation have been developed and
applied in diverse areas such as social sciences, e-business
and computer science, which resulted in many inconsistent
definitions. It has been observed that there is no formal
definition of trust and reputation in communication networking
literature ([31]). In this paper, we adopt definitions from the
literature on service-oriented environments because we find a
clear distinction between the trust and the reputation concepts.
We introduce these concepts in the forthcoming subsections.
A. Trust and Reputation Mechanisms in Complex Service-
Oriented Environments
Modern networks perform diverse functions from serving
communication pipelines to sensing to control. The new
paradigm in the field of networking is to design algorithms
and protocols for these complex networks. Every station in
the network seeks services from other stations in network.
Thus the network behaves as a complex environment where
network agents exchange a wide range of services. In such an
environment, fraudulent and incomplete practices might occur,
and consequently a serving or a served agent is at loss. In order
to provide agents with a sense of security to carry out these
transactions and services, the ideas of trust and reputation were
introduced in service-oriented environments ([5]).
In cyber and network security, we observe that concepts of
trust and security have been treated synonymously. However
trust is a much richer abstraction which can model more
complex interactions ([5]). To bring things in context, we
provide a brief summary of the trust concepts used in e-
services. For a detailed exposition, refer to chapters 2 and
8 of [5].
B. Trust and Reputation Concepts
Definition Trust is the belief that the trusting agent has in the
trusted agent’s willingness and capability to deliver a mutually
agreed service in a given context and at a given time.
Most trust relations are between a trusting agent and a
trusted agent. Every trust relation involves a context C and
time t. Such a binary relation is called a direct trust relation.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: Direct Trust Relation
However, in some scenarios it is not possible for a trusting
agent to initiate a direct trust relation with the trusted agent
due to spatial or temporal limitations. In such scenarios, the
trusting agent requests for recommendations from a third party.
The recommendations from this third party about the trusted
agent forms the initial trust for bootstrapping the transactions.
Such a ternary trust relation, illustrated in Fig. 2, is called a
indirect trust or reputation relation. In a reputation relation, the
trusting agent (X) sends a reputation query to a recommending
agent (third party Z) requesting for a recommendation for the
trusted agent (Y) on a context C at time t. If Z has a direct
trust relation (with the same context C at time t) with Y,
it replies to X with recommendations built from this direct
trust relation with Y. This recommendation is accepted by
X under another trust relation with a context called opinion
credibility. This opinion credibility encodes the belief that X
has on recommendations from Z. Associated with every trust
relation (direct or indirect) is a trustworthiness measure which
captures the strength of a trust relation. We show in Section IV,
that these trustworthiness measures live in an ordered space.
This order captures the strength of the trust relations (direct
trust, opinion credibility, etc.).
Trusting agent (X)  Trusted agent (Y) 
Recommending agent (Z) 
Fig. 2: Indirect Trust Relation
To illustrate these relations in a MANET setting, consider
any reputation based routing scheme such as CONFIDANT
([35]) or LARS ([12]). In these protocols, every station per-
forms self-policing: trust monitoring, trustworthiness update,
and response routing. In this setting, the context of relation
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is C=Packet Forwarding. The station first establishes a direct
trust relation with its neighbouring stations by local monitor-
ing. Based on its observations, every station makes trustworthi-
ness updates for every neighbouring station. For stations which
it cannot locally monitor, it updates the trustworthiness by
requesting for recommendations (via a indirect trust relation)
from the stations in its local neighbourhood. With reference
to the aforementioned relations, we find that a station shares
two relations with its local neighbourhood. There is a local
direct trust relation (C=Packet Forwarding) and an opinion
credibility relation. In other words, these protocols employ
the local neighbourhood as both trusting agents (for packet-
forwarding) and recommending agents. Unfortunately, many
of the protocols proposed do not clearly distinguish between
these two relations in assigning trustworthiness measures. Dif-
ferent trustworthiness measures must be used for the opinion
credibility (recommendations) and direct-trust relations ([5])
because a good forwarding agent can be a bad recommender
and vice versa.
C. Trustworthiness Measures
In the computer science community, several attempts have
been made to define trustworthiness measures, many of which
have been born from notions of subjective probability ([6]).
Recent research suggests that trust measures can also be
constructed using the more general Dempster-Shafer theory
([23]).
These works suggest different trustworthiness scales. [38]
and [16] use a binary trustworthiness measure to encode trust
and mistrust. [20] parametrizes the scale system with various
criteria such as agent satisfaction and credibility of the agent
feedback. The system proposed in [18] works on normalized
trust scale from 0 to 1. [28] proposes a discrete scale system
from -1 to 4. [1] proposes an ordinal system with four
levels of trustworthiness: {‘very trustworthy’, ‘trustworthy’,
‘untrustworthy’ and ‘very untrustworthy’}. There are also
other non-numeric systems such as [8] where the rating is
based on stars. These schemes are very common in the modern
e-business and e-services, e.g., Amazon and eBay.
A famous transitive recommender system is the web of trust
endorsing in PGP ([27]) in which the endorsed public keys
are rated as {unknown, untrusted, marginally trusted, fully
trusted}. In this reputation scheme the underlying context of
the trust relation is C=Validity of the key-user binding.
D. Trust and Reputation Mechanisms in Self-Organised Net-
works
Reputation systems have already proven useful in e-businesses
and e-services [5]. These systems, such as Amazon and eBay,
have a centralized architecture for the reputation system where
the decision makers are usually humans who look at the trust-
worthiness measures and make decisions. However, in self-
organized networks, the decision making must be automated
[31]. The automated decision making component must be
capable of interpreting the trustworthiness measures.
This decision making component is called the response
routing component in MANET routing ([29]). A trust-aware
routing component should:
1) Exploit the trusted paths for routing traffic, i.e., for paths
which have unambiguous trustworthiness measures, the
decision maker should route traffic without any subjec-
tive judgement.
2) Penalize the stations which do not conform to the packet
forwarding protocol.
In this paper, we design routing algorithms which cater to
the exploitatory nature of the decision making component. The
exploitable paths are those paths which the route decision
maker can clearly categorise as trusted or mistrusted. This
enables us to provide an optimization approach that is not spe-
cific to any particular trustworthiness measure. We generalize
the trustworthiness measures using an order-theoretic algebra
to develop our generic algorithms.
IV. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ORDERS
In this section, we show that most trustworthiness measures
defined in literature form an ordered set and in particular they
contain a linearly ordered subset that we can exploit for the
routing protocols.
Let us consider a set X . An order relation on X is a binary
relation ≤ such that ∀x, y, z ∈ X satisfies:
i. Reflexivity x ≤ x
ii. Antisymmetry x ≤ y and y ≤ x⇒ x = y
iii. Transitivity x ≤ y and y ≤ z ⇒ x ≤ z
The strict order relation x < y, for x, y ∈ X represents
x ≤ y and x 6= y. In a general ordered set not all elements
can be compared, i.e., x||y ⇒ x 6≤ y and y 6≤ x. Here || is
the incomparability relation. Another important order relation
is the covering relation ≺. x ≺ y, if x < y and x ≤ z <
y ⇒ x = z. In this case, x is called the covered element
of y, and y is called the covering element of x. A linearly
ordered set XL satisfies an additional trichotomy condition:
∀x, y ∈ XL, x ≤ y or y ≤ x.
Another characteristic of ordered set is that they satisfy the
duality principle: Given an ordered set X , we can construct
its dual ordered set X ∂ by defining x ≤ y to hold in X ∂ iff
y ≤ x in X . ⊥ ∈ X is the bottom element if ⊥ ≤ x, ∀x ∈ X .
Dually, the top element > is the bottom element of X ∂ .
To illustrate the order embedding in trustworthiness mea-
sures, consider the PGP trustworthiness set X = {unknown
(A), untrusted (B), marginally trusted (C), fully trusted (D)}.
In trust methods it is incorrect to endow unknown entities with
mistrust ([5]). Thus unknown entities form a separate class of
agents whose trustworthiness needs to be learned. However
the subset XL = {B,C,D} is the set of measures that can
be exploited for routing (see Subsection III-D) because these
measures can be clearly classified as trusted or mistrusted.
Mathematically, this rationale is represented as:
A||x, ∀x ∈ XL
B ≺ C ≺ D
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Clearly, XL is a linearly ordered set which can be used for
making exploitatory routing decisions. While X has no bottom
element, XL has ⊥ = B.
In the paper we work with trustworthiness measures which
live in a finite set. Such measures encompass a large body
of literature on trust and reputation systems ([16], [20],[28],
[1],[8], Amazon, eBay, etc).
Lemma 4.1: Any finite linearly ordered set has a top ele-
ment.
Lemma 4.2: For any finite linearly ordered set, every ele-
ment other than > has a covering element.
The above lemmas are proved in [2].
V. ROUTING METRICS
Most of the work on routing inspired from trust and reputation
mechanisms uses only the trustworthiness measure to find
the optimal routes for packet forwarding ([32], [30], [12]).
In MANETs, such an approach might route packets through
high delay (length) paths. In many scenarios, such high lengths
might be intolerable for the application traffic. In this paper, we
define two semiring metrics for the path to capture the length
and the trustworthiness of a path. We address this problem as
a bi-objective graph optimization problem.
In ephemeral MANETs, all graph relations, trustworthiness
measures and length measures are time varying. In the models
we use, although we do not explicitly mention the dependence
on time t, it is assumed that all the relations and the measures
are time varying. We consider a unit disc model for commu-
nication, which is an abstraction of an isotropic model for
radio communication. Let the isotropic communication range
of any station be ρ. The unit disc model induces an undirected
communication graph Gc(V,Ec) where V is the node set
representing the stations in a MANET. Let xi be the position
of the node i ∈ V in Euclidean space. Ec represents the edge
incidence for the communication graph Gc. (i, j) ∈ Ec iff
‖ xi − xj ‖≤ ρ. Let Ni denote the local neighbourhood (the
set of one-hop neighbours) for node i ∈ V . The inclusive
neighbourhood is given by N+i = Ni ∪ {i}. Let PS,T denote
the set of paths between a source-target pair S, T ∈ V .
The trust relations induce a directed graph GX(V,AX)
called a trust relation graph. Here the arc set AX represents
the trust relations. The two different trust relations in the local
neighbourhood are shown Fig. 3. We consider an arbitrary
context C for these trust relations. Let dt(i, j) denote the
direct trust trustworthiness that node i has on j in context
C. Let oc(i, j) denote the strength of the opinions (opinion
credibility trustworthiness) that i receives from j in context
C. Let r(i, jm, jn) denote the recommendation that i receives
from jn about jm in context C. In MANETs, the trust relations
for i are not typically limited to Ni because the mobility
of MANET nodes creates dynamic trust relations beyond the
local neighbourhood ([23]).
Given the trustworthiness of the trust relations, there exist
several fusion rules that fuse these measures to create a














Fig. 3: Local trust relationship
fusion rule at i in rating j by
F : (dt(i, j), {oc(i, jn),∀n}, {r(i, j, jn),∀n}) 7→ x
The output x of the fusion map F lives in an abstract
ordered set X introduced in Section IV. We assume that this
same fusion rule is carried out at every i ∈ V . In essence,
the fusion rule associates a trustworthiness x(i, j), ∀(i, j) ∈
AX .
A. Trustworthiness of a Path
Let us consider a path p = S → i1 → i2 → · · · in−1 → T
in Gc. Associated with every directed arc (im, in) is a trust-
worthiness x(im, in) ∈ X . In defining the trustworthiness of a
path, it is reasonable to adhere to the adage that the strength of
a chain (path) is limited to the strength of its weakest link. If
the trustworthiness of a link along a path falls in an unknown
category, the trustworthiness of this path is also unknown.
Since the routing controller works only on the exploitable
paths, it suffices to consider paths containing only links whose
trustworthiness is exploitable. Let us denote this set of paths
as
PLST = {p ∈ PS,T : ∀(im, in) ∈ p, x(im, in) ∈ XL}
Then the trustworthiness of path p ∈ PLS,T is
xp ≤ x(im, in),∀(im, in) ∈ p
⇒ xp ≤ min
(im,in)∈p
x(im, in)




The duality principle of ordered sets provides an equivalent
metric in terms of the dual ordered set. If we impose the dual







x < y xi ≤ yi i = 1, 2 and x 6= y Componentwise
x ≤lex y xk < yk or x = y k = min{i : xi 6= yi} Lexicographic
x ≤MO y max{x1, x2} ≤ max{y1, y2} Max-order
TABLE I: Table of Orders
B. Length of a Path
For legacy routing schemes such as ARPANET ([14]) or IP
([9]), we associate a length lp for path p. This could be a
simple metric such as the hop count or more complicated
average delay statistics which capture the delay of the path.
In the wireless multi-hop scenario, the delays are primarily
due to the congestion in the local MAC. Let us denote the
queue congestion metric at station im for packets destined to





The algorithms in this paper are generic and invariant to the
path length metric. However, we do assume that the path length
composition is an additive composition along the path.
VI. ROUTE SELECTION - A BI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION
PROBLEM
In Subsections V-A and V-B, we introduced the trust and
length measures for the path. A good design criteria for
a routing controller is to construct routes that have high
trustworthiness and low length. However, in general these two
objectives may be opposing in nature, which results in a trade-
off analysis problem. This is the primary object of study in
multi-criteria optimization. A summary of the various multi-
criteria methods can be found in [22].
The two objectives of the routing controller to constructs





The dual trustworthiness transforms the problem into a bi-





objective optimization problem is represented as a Multi-
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a vector valued objective function that maps the decision
alternatives to the length-dual-trust (R+ × XL∂) objective
space. There are various ≤2 orders that can be considered
for vectors. Table I shows the most commonly used orders
for two-dimensional vectors x and y. Among these orders, the
Max order is valid only when XL∂ is comparable with R+.
A. Length and Trust Semirings
The presented MCOP involves two semiring structures
([10]). The length optimization problem corresponds to a
(R+,min,+) semiring. The trust optimization problem corre-
sponds to a (X l,max,min) semiring. Both of these semiring
structures have been independently studied and extensively
used in the optimization community ([10]). In the theory of
MCOP classes, there are many possible methods to combine
objectives to obtain solutions ([22]). However, to the best of
our knowledge, no theory has combined these two semirings
in the various MCOP settings. In the forthcoming subsections,
we present distributed polynomial-time algorithms to solve the
various bi-objective optimization formulations. We consider
the length-dual-trust MCOP in Eqn. 1 as the goal for these
algorithms.
B. Pareto Optimal Routing Strategy







,R+ ×XL∂ , <) (2)
where < is the component-wise order defined in Table I. A
path pefficient ∈ PLS,T is Pareto optimal if there exists no path









For a general decision problem, there are many Pareto efficient
points ([22]). One of the common methods to compute efficient
points is using the Haimes-ε constraint method ([41], [37]),
which converts all but one of the objectives into constraints and
solves the single-objective constraint optimization problem.
By considering various relaxations of the Haimes method, we
obtain all the Pareto solutions.
Semiring Decomposition: In our case, we show that the
Haimes-ε constraint method lends itself to a natural decom-





x∂p ≤ ε, ε ∈ X ∂
L
(4)
The constraint x∂p ≤ ε ⇒ max
(im,in)∈p
x∂(im, in) ≤ ε
⇒ x∂(im, in) ≤ ε,∀(im, in) ∈ p.
This implication gives the following decomposition.
Subproblem 1(ε): Find a subset of paths in PLS,T whose paths
have a trustworthiness less than ε. This corresponds to finding
a pruned subset:





The decomposition is evident as Subprob 1(ε) involves only
the trust semiring and Subprob 2(ε) involves only the length
semiring. This decomposition yields an edge exclusion and
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shortest path procedure to solve Eqn. 2. Algorithm 1 builds
on these ideas to obtain all the Pareto efficient paths between
a source destination pair S, T . It runs on every i ∈ V
and requires only local neighbourhood information (Ni). The
routine call Covered Element(x) returns the covered
element of x.




Construct Reduced Graph Gr(ε) by Edge Exclusion
Er ← Ec
for j ∈ Ni do
if x(i, j) > ε then




PL-Pruned-εS,T ← Set of paths between
S, T pair in Gr(V,Er)




pefficient ← arg min
p∈Pcandidate
x∂p
PL-FrontierS,T ← PL-FrontierS,T ∪ peffecient
ε← Covered element(x∂pefficient )
until PL-Pruned-εS,T 6= ∅
return PL-FrontierS,T
Proof of Optimality of Algorithm 1: Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2
guarantee the existence of the top and the cover element used
in the algorithm. First we show that PL-FrontierS,T contains all the
Pareto efficient paths in Gc. Suppose p ∈ PL-FrontierS,T is not











. Here two cases are possible.
Case I: lq < lp and x∂q ≤ x∂p .
x∂q ≤ x∂p ⇒ if p is preserved during Edge Exclusion in
Algorithm 1 then so is q. Then Compute Shortest Path
will never yield p, which is a contradiction.
Case II: lq ≤ lp and x∂q < x∂p .
Again the Edge Exclusion that preserves p also pre-
serves q. If lq < lp, then p will be sieved out during
Compute Shortest Path. This implies lq = lp. Since
p ∈ Pcandidate, we have q ∈ Pcandidate. Then pefficient can
never be p as x∂q < x
∂
p .
Since both cases contradict, we have that p is Pareto
efficient. Next we show that there are no more Pareto paths
other than those in PL-FrontierS,T . Suppose q 6∈ PL-FrontierS,T is a
Pareto path. Suppose that ε1 = > > ε2 > ε3 > · · · > εN
be the finite sequence of Edge Exclusion thresholds. Let
εi+1 < x∂q ≤ εi for some i. Consider the iteration when ε = εi.
There are two cases when q is not not chosen in PL-FrontierS,T .
Case I: q 6∈ PcandidateS,T .
Let q′ = pefficient be the efficient path chosen at this iteration.











This implies that q is dominated by q′ and hence is not a Pareto
path. This contradiction implies x∂q′ > x
∂
q . By definition,
Covered Element gives εi+1 ≺ x∂q′ . But εi+1 < x∂q ⇒
x∂q = x
∂
q′ , which is a contradiction.
Case II: q ∈ PcandidateS,T .
Again let q′ = pefficient be the efficient path chosen at this
iteration. In this case lq′ = lq . In this case only q′ or q can
be Pareto efficient but not both. This is again a contradiction
and this completes the reverse implication. Hence PL-FrontierS,T
contains all the Pareto paths and nothing other than the Pareto
paths.
C. Biased Routing Strategy
A shortcoming of using the Pareto optimality approach is that
the number of paths optimal in the Pareto sense is large. One
popular approach to prune the Pareto set is Lexicographic
Ordering ([22]). This method assumes that one measure is
superior to the other and tries to optimize with respect to
the superior measure. Only if two or more feasible solutions
are equally optimal in the superior measure, then the other







Based on the lexicographic ordering that we choose, we obtain
length or trust biased routing strategies. The strategies consider
the length or the trust as the superior measure, respectively.
To obtain these paths, we introduce two semiring algebras.
Length-Lexicographic Semiring: (R+ × XL∂ ,⊕d,⊗).
The semiring operations are defined as follows. For
(d1, x1∂), (d2, x2∂) ∈ (R+ ×XL∂) we define:
(d1, x1∂)⊕l (d2, x2∂)
=
 (d1, x1
∂) if d1 < d2
(d2, x2∂) if d2 < d1
(d1,min(x1∂ , x2∂) if d1 = d2
(d1, x1∂)⊗ (d2, x2∂) = (d1 + d2,min(x1∂ , x2∂))
Trust-Lexicographic Semiring: (R+ × XL∂ ,⊕x,⊗).
The semiring operations are defined as follows. For
(d1, x1∂), (d2, x2∂) ∈ (R+ ×XL∂) we define:
(d1, x1∂)⊕x (d2, x2∂)
=
 (d1, x1
∂) if x1∂ < x2∂
(d2, x2∂) if x2∂ < x1∂
(min(d1, d2), x1∂) if x1∂ = x2∂
(d1, x1∂)⊗ (d2, x2∂) = (d1 + d2,min(x1∂ , x2∂))
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Defining these semirings facilitates the development of a
generic distributed algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 2) to obtain
lexicographic optimal paths between the source target pair
S, T . Again, the algorithm runs at every i ∈ V and needs
only local information. The stations locally store and exchange
a dynamic pair (l, x∂)[T ]ni ∈ (R+ × XL
∂) which represents
the cost of the best lexicographic path from i to T that the
algorithm can construct in n iterations.
Algorithm 2 Compute Lexicographic/Biased Path
repeat
(l, x∂)[T ]n+1i =
⊕
k∈N+i
(di,k, x∂(i, k))⊗ (l, x∂)[T ]nk
until (l, x∂)[T ]ni converges
The
⊕
used in Algorithm 2 is ⊕l and ⊕x for length and
trust biased routing, respectively.
Proof of Lexicographic Optimality of Algorithm 2: The al-
gorithm converges because all delay weights are non-negative
[10]. Consider the length-biased routing. At source S, let p∗
be the path returned by the algorithm. Suppose p∗ is not an
optimal length-biased path. Then ∃p 6= p∗ such that:
Case I . lp < lp∗ . This is not possible as all the sub-paths
are optimal in the length (by definition of ⊕l).
Case II. lp = lp∗ and x∂p < x
∂
p∗. This is not possible either
because the sub-paths are optimal in the trust sense if the
lengths are equal (from the definition of ⊕l). A similar proof
follows for the trust-biased routing.
D. Conservative Routing Strategy
Another formulation in bi-objective optimization is the Max-
Ordering (MO) method ([22]). However, this method is ap-
plicable to our problem only if the trust values and the
path lengths are comparable. If they are, then we obtain a







The above MCOP class tries to select paths which are optimal
in the worst-case sense of trust and delay. Thus it is a
conservative strategy for routing, where the cost of the path is
governed by the worst-case value of its trust and delay. The




Semiring Decomposition: The MO problem involves the trust
and length semirings. We present decomposition method to






Again, the decomposition yields an Edge Exclusion and a
Shortest Path procedure to obtain the MO paths. This is illus-
trated in Algorithm 3 which is carried out at every i ∈ V . The
algorithm assigns an infinite cost to a non-existent path. The
routine call Covering Element(x) returns the covering
element of x.
Algorithm 3 Compute MO paths
z ← ⊥
while True do
Construct Reduced Graph Gr(ε, t) by Edge
Exclusion
Er ← Ec
for j ∈ Ni do
if x(i, j) > ε then




Compute Shortest Path between (S, T ) on Gr
PL-Pruned-εS,T ← Set of paths between
(S, T ) pair in Gr(V,Er)
pcandidate ← arg min
p∈PL-Pruned-εS,T
p
if lpcandidate ≤ ε then
return pcandidate
end if
if ε =?> then




Proof of MO Optimality of Algorithm 3: Since the sequence
of ε’s is monotone and X l is finite, the algorithm converges.
When the algorithm terminates, pcandidate has lpcandidate ≤ ε
and x∂pcandidate ≤ ε. And ε ∈ X
∂ is the smallest element
for which this condition is satisfied. Thus pcandidate upon
termination is indeed MO optimal.
The three algorithms proposed use the Shortest path
subroutine and Edge Exclusion subroutine repeatedly.
This is a manifestation of the Semiring decomposition prin-
ciple. There are many efficient polynomial-time distributed
implementations for both of these subroutines ([13]). Thus
all these algorithms can be efficiently implemented in a self-
organised MANET.
VII. CASE STUDY
We present a simple scenario of a MANET that describes
the capabilities of the trust methods and the application of
our optimization algorithms. Before we discuss the results,
we first identify the trust relations hidden in the scenario.
Although trust methods can be used to capture complex
contexts, we adopt a simple PGP based web of trust model
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for ease of illustration. Here the context is C=Validity of Key-
User Binding. We adopt PGP’s trustworthiness measures X =
{unknown (A), untrusted (B), marginally trusted (C), fully
trusted (D)}. The exploitatory set is X = {B,C,D}.
Consider a set of MANET stations (0-22), shown in Fig. 4,
which we call a unit. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
X, Y, and Z associate themselves with the unit later. At
deployment, all of the unit members’ key-user bindings are
trusted by all unit members. This means that the direct trust
graph is a complete directed graph with the trustworthiness
measure of each arc being fully trusted, i.e., dt(in, im) = fully
trusted (D), ∀im, in ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 22} and im 6= in. If any
non-member k dynamically associates itself to the network,
then ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . 22} :
dt(i, k) =
{





































































Fig. 4: MANET Scenario with ally UAVs
There is a single certifying authority (node 0, CA), which
can endorse other key-user bindings. However, the web of
trust endows the other unit members (nodes 1-22) with some
endorsing power. We define a simple rule for such a web of
trust (OpenPGP offers the freedom for flexible web of trust
definitions [27]).
Web of Trust Policy:
1) Any key endorsed by the CA is fully trusted (D).
2) Any key endorsed by three or more fully trusted entities
is marginally trusted (C).
3) Any key endorsed by two fully trusted entities is un-
trusted (B).
4) Any key endorsed by fewer than two entities is unknown
(A).
This policy definition assigns the trustworthiness measures for
different opinion credibilities. We adopt a numeric scheme
for the PGP to encode the opinion credibility trustworthiness
similar to the one described in [11]. Trustworthiness measures
for the opinion credibility are given by:
1) Member → CA Relation = ∞
2) Member → Member Relation = 1
3) Member → Non-Member Relation = 0
The fusion rule between any two entities i and j is then given
by
F (dt(i, j), {oc(i, jn), jn ∈ J}, {r(i, j, jn), jn ∈ J}
=

D if dt(i,j)=D or Pjn∈J:r(i,j,jn)=D oc(i,jn)=∞
C if dt(i, j) 6= D,
∑
jn∈J:r(i,j,jn)=D oc(i, jn) ≥ 3
B if dt(i, j) 6= D,
∑
jn∈J:r(i,j,jn)=D oc(i, jn) = 2
A if dt(i, j) 6= D,
∑
jn∈J:r(i,j,jn)=D oc(i, jn) < 2
Where J is the set of recommenders. The weights on the
edges in Fig. 4 represent the delay in the interface links. We
have chosen the example in such a way that links (11, 15) and
(14, 18) are overloaded. Let three ally UAVs (i.e., X, Y, and
Z) enter the scene to support the traffic for these overloaded
links. We assume that at this moment the CA is either offline
or is inaccessible to endorse these ally UAVs. However, to
sustain the communications, this dynamic association must be
endorsed by the unit members. Suppose the ally UAVs are
able to authenticate themselves to the neighbouring members,
then these members can endorse the UAVs’ keys. As per our
web of trust fusion F , UAV X becomes untrusted (B) and
UAVs Y and Z become marginally trusted (C). The fusion
rule assigns these trustworthiness measures to every edge in
the graph shown in Fig. 4. All edges incident between the unit
members are fully trusted. The edges incident from UAV X
are untrusted and those from UAVs Y and Z are marginally
trusted.
This configuration sets up the problem for our bi-objective
routing algorithms. The two measures being the delay and the
trust of the paths. Consider a source-target pair (1, 21) for
which our distributed algorithm yields all of the Pareto paths
(given in Table II). Among the Pareto paths, p1 is the delay-
lexicographic optimal path and p3 is the trust-lexicographic
optimal path.
For this instance of the problem, PL-Frontier1,21 consists of the
paths with all possible trustworthiness measures. The savings
in delay by shifting to a path with lower trustworthiness are
also computable from PL-Frontier1,21 . We now introduce a simple
change in the scenario which modifies PL-Frontier1,21 . Suppose that
all the interface delays at the UAV Z are changed from 8
to 4, then the frontier reduces to two paths {p4, p3}, where
p4 is 1 → 2 → 3 → 0 → 12 → Z → 16 → 19 → 21
with (lp4, xp4) = (35,marginally trusted(c)). This shows that
Algorithm 1 is able to identify that all untrusted paths are
dominated in the Pareto sense. This suggest that MANET
can support efficient minimum-delay traffic by routing through
marginally trusted and fully trusted paths.
However, we cannot consider MO for this example because
the trust and delay in this scenario are not comparable.
PL-FrontierS,T clearly summarizes the trade-off relations between
the trust and the delay measures. This capability of the
our distributed algorithms to autonomously compute these
tradeoffs enables the system to route different classes of traffic
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Path p (lp, xp)
p1(1→ 2→ 6→ 10→ 11→ X → 15→ 19→ 21) (36, B)
p2(1→ 4→ 5→ 9→ 14→ 25→ 20→ 22→ 21) (37, C)
p3(1→ 2→ 6→ 10→ 11→ 15→ 19→ 21) (46, D)
TABLE II: Set of Pareto efficient paths
(based on the sensitivity of the information) through different
paths. We trust that this simple scenario captures the order-
theoretic modelling of the trustworthiness and the usefulness
of our graph optimization algorithms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an order-theoretic modelling of the
trustworthiness measures used in different trust and reputation
systems. We then treat the trusted routing as a bi-objective path
optimization problem involving length and trust measures. We
solve the corresponding Pareto class, which yields the efficient
paths. We also solve the Lexicographic and MO classes. In all
three cases, we present distributed polynomial-time algorithms
that can be implemented in a self-organised MANET. We
show that this distributed implementation is a manifestation
of a Semiring decomposition principle. By means of a case
study, we present a simple application of our trusted routing
algorithms.
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